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ince late August, 1962, the Kennedy Administration had suspected that Soviet activities in Cuba would lead to a confrontation. On October 14, Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson flew his U-2 plane over western Cuba and brought back photographic evidence of Soviet missiles. Designed to carry nuclear warheads, the missiles pointed directly at the U.S.-only 90 miles away. Over the next several days, intelligence operations identified a wide variety of Soviet military equipment and personnel in Cuba.

Tuesday, October 16:The famed "thirteen days" began when President Kennedy examined the photographs and convened the ExComm. During the first discussions, the ExComm appeared to favor a U.S. air strike. No option was foolproof, as Khrushchev was sure to retaliate with nuclear weapons that would reach the U.S. in moments. The risk was global nuclear war.

ExComm debated their course of action throughout day two, careful to prevent any leaks to the press that would spin the situation out of control. To avoid undue attention, the President maintained his routine schedule. Ironically, one of his first meetings was with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko.

During their meeting, Gromyko urged Kennedy to stop threatening Cuba. He asserted that the U.S.S.R.'s assistance to Cuba only involved agriculture and land development, and a small amount of defensive arms. Gromyko denied placing any Soviet offensive weapons on the island.

In the president's absence, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy took the lead in ExComm meetings. Playing the role of both "hawk" (favoring military attack) and "dove" (favoring peaceful resolution), RFK compelled the turning point in the group's thinking. As he listened to his colleagues outlining a surprise attack on Cuba, RFK wrote a note that said, "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor." RFK insisted that the group keep thinking until an alternative to "Pearl Harbor in reverse" presented itself.

An alternative did come from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the form of a proposed naval blockade of Cuba, which would prevent Soviet missile shipments from reaching the island. It would also demonstrate to Khrushchev that the U.S. would stand against any Soviet aggression.

President Kennedy and the ExComm prepared for the public disclosure of the Cuba situation via a televised address. U.S. diplomats informed the Allies and prepared for emergency sessions of the Organization of American States (OAS) and United Nations Security Council. They briefed Congressional leaders and alerted armed forces.

U.S. military troops moved into Florida in anticipation of an invasion. B-52 bombers of the Strategic Air Command were positioned and Air Force reserve pilots prepared to fly transport planes. The First Armored Division moved from Texas to Georgia and ships deployed to the Caribbean Sea. This done, the U.S. stood prepared to escalate if necessary.


Monday, October 22:
President Kennedy met with Congressional leaders while Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, visited Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to tell him about the planned blockade. At 7 p.m. Kennedy appeared on national TV to announce the discovery of the missiles and the resulting naval blockade. The speech outlined the immediate action and threatened further action if Chairman Khrushchev did not halt his perilous arms build-up.

Tuesday, October 23: The OAS offered Kennedy a unanimous vote supporting the blockade. Then the President initiated two contacts with Soviet officials. He asked RFK to speak to Dobrynin, who claimed to be ignorant of Moscow's plans for Cuba. Then the President wrote a personal note to Khrushchev, explaining the OAS action and urging Chairman Khrushchev to act prudently and honor the blockade.

Wednesday, October 24: The naval blockade took effect. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev acted cautiously to avoid a clash. Two Soviet ships reached the blockade line and halted their positions. Soon other Soviet ships stopped or turned back. Khrushchev had decided not to challenge-but he had not officially acknowledged the blockade.

Thursday, October 25: The president permitted a Soviet tanker, the Bucharest, to pass through after adequate identification. Back in New York, at the U.N. Security Council meeting, U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson confronted Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.N., with the photographs of the Cuban missiles.

Friday, October 26: The U.S. Navy boarded the Marcula, a Lebanese-registered freighter under Panamanian and Greek ownership, leased to the Soviet Union. Because the U.S.S.R did not own the vessel, the search symbolized a moderate stance. They found no weapons aboard.

That afternoon the White House received a 10-page letter from Khrushchev. It opened with an emotional description of the death, destruction, and anarchy that would result from nuclear war. This, he wrote, must be avoided. The letter indicated that, if Kennedy would agree not to attack Cuba and would recall the fleet, then Khrushchev would remove the missiles.

Saturday, October 27: A second letter arrived from Khrushchev. In it he appeared to withdraw his concessions from the previous day-perhaps under pressure from other forces in the Soviet leadership. It stated that the U.S. must remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey and pledge not to invade Cuba. At about the same time the second letter arrived, the White House learned that a Soviet surface-to-air missile had shot down a U-2 over Cuba, killing the pilot-the same Major Anderson who had taken the initial photographs.

Suddenly, the crisis teetered on the brink of nuclear war. The ExComm "hawks" wanted to unleash an attack. Yet the President held them back and decided to contact Khrushchev again. Kennedy had received inside information via unconventional means. ABC News correspondent John Scali had met with Soviet official Aleksandr Fomin, who indicated that Khrushchev would withdraw if the U.S. pledged not to invade Cuba.

The President wrote to Khrushchev again, but responded as if to his first letter, ignoring the second. Kennedy would agree not to invade Cuba and promised to end the blockade when the Soviets removed their missiles. He did not mention the request to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey.

Kennedy was willing to remove the U.S. missiles from the Turkish base, but neither publicly nor under duress. He sent RFK to meet with Dobrynin to relay the message verbally.

Sunday, October 28: News broke that Khrushchev had accepted Kennedy's deal. Khrushchev's statement implied that the missiles in Cuba had been defensive, and since the U.S. had promised not to invade Cuba, the missiles were no longer necessary and would be removed. Kennedy responded with comments that welcomed Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision. He added that the negotiated solution to the crisis allowed the two super powers to consider ending the arms race.

The one person disappointed about peaceful settlement was Castro. He had wanted a clear-cut victory over the U.S., but had been left out of negotiations. Castro refused to cooperate with the U.N., so the U.S. verified the removal of the missile sites in the same way it discovered them-using aerial photographs.

On November 20, the U.S. ended its naval blockade. The U.S.S.R. removed the last of its weapons in early December. The Cuban Missile Crisis ended with both sides claiming victory.

 

 


 

n October 1962, the "thirteen days" of the Cuban Missile Crisis placed President Kennedy in a nuclear standoff with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev. Photographs taken by an American reconnaissance plane flying over Cuba produced evidence of a Soviet missile build-up. The President reacted to this sobering news by engaging his top advisers in secret sessions of the Executive Committee, or ExComm, to devise a strategy for U.S. response. The outcome was a naval quarantine, or blockade, preventing Soviet ships from reaching Cuba. The U.S.S.R. acknowledged the blockade, buying more time for the leaders of the world's super powers to avoid nuclear war. Throughout the next week, President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev negotiated the removal of Soviet weapons in Cuba in exchange for the U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba; the U.S. also secretly agreed to remove its own nuclear weapons in Turkey.

Principal Members of ExComm

George W.Ball, Under Secretary of State
Charles "Chip" Bohlen, Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; left ExComm to become Ambassador to France
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury
William C. Foster, Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Roswell Gilpatrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense
U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department
Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President
John F. Kennedy, President
Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General
Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department
John A. McCone, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
Bramley Smith, Executive Secretary
Theodore C. Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President
Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations
Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Advisor to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Llewellyn E. Thompson, United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Donald Wilson, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency


For More Information try these books:
Bay of Pigs Declassified
The Kennedy Tapes
Thirteen Days
The Kennedys and Cuba
The Most Dangerous Area in the World



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