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Tuesday,
October 16:The famed "thirteen days" began when President ExComm debated their course of action throughout day two, careful to prevent any leaks to the press that would spin the situation out of control. To avoid undue attention, the President maintained his routine schedule. Ironically, one of his first meetings was with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko. During
their meeting, Gromyko urged Kennedy to stop threatening Cuba. He asserted
that the U.S.S.R.'s assistance to Cuba only involved agriculture and land
development, and a small amount of defensive arms. Gromyko denied placing
any Soviet offensive weapons on the island.
An alternative did come from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the form of a proposed naval blockade of Cuba, which would prevent Soviet missile shipments from reaching the island. It would also demonstrate to Khrushchev that the U.S. would stand against any Soviet aggression. President Kennedy and the ExComm prepared for the public disclosure of the Cuba situation via a televised address. U.S. diplomats informed the Allies and prepared for emergency sessions of the Organization of American States (OAS) and United Nations Security Council. They briefed Congressional leaders and alerted armed forces.
Tuesday, October 23: The OAS offered Kennedy a unanimous vote supporting the blockade. Then the President initiated two contacts with Soviet officials. He asked RFK to speak to Dobrynin, who claimed to be ignorant of Moscow's plans for Cuba. Then the President wrote a personal note to Khrushchev, explaining the OAS action and urging Chairman Khrushchev to act prudently and honor the blockade. Wednesday, October 24: The naval blockade took effect. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev acted cautiously to avoid a clash. Two Soviet ships reached the blockade line and halted their positions. Soon other Soviet ships stopped or turned back. Khrushchev had decided not to challenge-but he had not officially acknowledged the blockade. Thursday, October 25: The president permitted a Soviet tanker, the Bucharest, to pass through after adequate identification. Back in New York, at the U.N. Security Council meeting, U.S. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson confronted Valerian Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.N., with the photographs of the Cuban missiles. Friday, October 26: The U.S. Navy boarded the Marcula, a Lebanese-registered freighter under Panamanian and Greek ownership, leased to the Soviet Union. Because the U.S.S.R did not own the vessel, the search symbolized a moderate stance. They found no weapons aboard. That afternoon the White House received a 10-page letter from Khrushchev. It opened with an emotional description of the death, destruction, and anarchy that would result from nuclear war. This, he wrote, must be avoided. The letter indicated that, if Kennedy would agree not to attack Cuba and would recall the fleet, then Khrushchev would remove the missiles. Saturday, October 27: A second letter arrived from Khrushchev. In it he appeared to withdraw his concessions from the previous day-perhaps under pressure from other forces in the Soviet leadership. It stated that the U.S. must remove its Jupiter missiles from Turkey and pledge not to invade Cuba. At about the same time the second letter arrived, the White House learned that a Soviet surface-to-air missile had shot down a U-2 over Cuba, killing the pilot-the same Major Anderson who had taken the initial photographs. Suddenly, the crisis teetered on the brink of nuclear war. The ExComm "hawks" wanted to unleash an attack. Yet the President held them back and decided to contact Khrushchev again. Kennedy had received inside information via unconventional means. ABC News correspondent John Scali had met with Soviet official Aleksandr Fomin, who indicated that Khrushchev would withdraw if the U.S. pledged not to invade Cuba. The President wrote to Khrushchev again, but responded as if to his first letter, ignoring the second. Kennedy would agree not to invade Cuba and promised to end the blockade when the Soviets removed their missiles. He did not mention the request to remove U.S. missiles from Turkey. Kennedy was willing to remove the U.S. missiles from the Turkish base, but neither publicly nor under duress. He sent RFK to meet with Dobrynin to relay the message verbally. Sunday, October 28: News broke that Khrushchev had accepted Kennedy's deal. Khrushchev's statement implied that the missiles in Cuba had been defensive, and since the U.S. had promised not to invade Cuba, the missiles were no longer necessary and would be removed. Kennedy responded with comments that welcomed Khrushchev's statesmanlike decision. He added that the negotiated solution to the crisis allowed the two super powers to consider ending the arms race. The one person disappointed about peaceful settlement was Castro. He had wanted a clear-cut victory over the U.S., but had been left out of negotiations. Castro refused to cooperate with the U.N., so the U.S. verified the removal of the missile sites in the same way it discovered them-using aerial photographs.
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