Unfinished Business: Kennedy and Cuba

Since late August 1962, the Kennedy Administration had suspected that Soviet activities in Cuba would lead to a confrontation. On October 14, Air Force Major Rudolf Anderson flew his U-2 plane over western Cuba and brought back photographic evidence of Soviet missiles. Designed to carry nuclear warheads, the missiles pointed directly at the U.S.—only 90 miles away. Over the next several days, intelligence operations identified a wide variety of Soviet military equipment and personnel in Cuba.

Tuesday, October 16: The famed "13 days" began when President Kennedy examined the photographs and convened the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm). During the first discussions, ExComm appeared to favor a U.S. air strike. No option was foolproof, as Khrushchev was sure to retaliate with nuclear weapons that would reach the U.S. in minutes. The risk was global nuclear war.

ExComm debated its course of action throughout day two, careful to prevent any leaks to the press that would spin the situation out of control. To avoid undue attention, the president maintained his routine schedule. Ironically, one of his first meetings was with Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko.

During their meeting, Gromyko urged Kennedy to stop threatening Cuba. He asserted that the USSR's assistance to Cuba involved only agriculture and land development and a small amount of defensive arms. Gromyko denied placing any Soviet offensive weapons on the island.

In the president's absence, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy took the lead in ExComm meetings. Playing the role of both "hawk" (favoring military attack) and "dove" (favoring peaceful resolution), RFK compelled the turning point in the group's thinking. As he listened to his colleagues outlining a surprise attack on Cuba, RFK wrote a note that said, "I now know how Tojo felt when he was planning Pearl Harbor." RFK insisted that the group keep thinking until an alternative to "Pearl Harbor in reverse" presented itself.

An alternative did come from Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the form of a proposed naval blockade of Cuba, which would prevent Soviet missile shipments from reaching the island. It would also demonstrate to Khrushchev that the U.S. would stand against any Soviet aggression.

President Kennedy and ExComm prepared for the public disclosure of the Cuba situation via a televised address. U.S. diplomats informed the Allies and prepared for emergency sessions of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations Security Council. They briefed congressional leaders and alerted the armed forces.

U.S. military troops moved into Florida in anticipation of an invasion. B-52 bombers of the Strategic Air Command were positioned, and Air Force reserve pilots prepared to fly transport planes. The First Armored Division moved from Texas to Georgia, and ships deployed to the Caribbean Sea. This done, the U.S. stood prepared to escalate if necessary.

Monday, October 22: President Kennedy met with congressional leaders while Secretary of State Dean Rusk visited Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin to tell him about the planned blockade. At 7 p.m. Kennedy appeared on national TV to announce the discovery of the missiles and the resulting naval blockade. The speech outlined the immediate action and threatened further action if Khrushchev did not halt his perilous arms buildup.

Tuesday, October 23: The OAS offered Kennedy a unanimous vote supporting the blockade. The president initiated two contacts with Soviet officials. He asked RFK to speak to Dobrynin, who claimed to be ignorant of Moscow's plans for Cuba. Then the president wrote a personal note to Khrushchev, explaining the OAS action and urging him to act prudently and honor the blockade.